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  the	  direction	  of	  Andrew	  Jason	  Cohen	  	  	  	  ABSTRACT	  	  In	  this	  thesis	  I	  will	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  and	  freedom.	  	  I	  will	  defend	  G.A.	  Cohen’s	  critique	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  and	  try	  to	  show	  how	  his	  argument	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  hostile	  to	  genuine	  freedom	  presents	  a	  problem	  for	  Nozick.	  	  I	  think	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  does	  little	  to	  protect	  a	  meaningful	  sort	  of	  freedom;	  and	  a	  meaningful	  sort	  of	  freedom	  is	  exactly	  what	  Nozick	  aims	  to	  protect.	  	  This	  is	  true	  because	  eudaimonistic	  moral	  beliefs	  ought	  to	  undergird	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis,	  and	  self-­‐ownership	  can	  therefore	  be	  assessed	  in	  light	  of	  whether	  it	  actually	  promotes	  human	  flourishing	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways.	  	  This	  undergirding	  eudaimonism	  
	   	  
becomes	  clear	  when	  we	  see	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  intended	  to	  protect	  the	  ability	  of	  each	  individual	  to	  pursue	  and	  act	  upon	  her	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	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Introduction	  	  	   The	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  is	  thought	  to	  be	  a	  freedom-­‐preserving	  principle.	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  appears	  to	  provide	  each	  person	  a	  moral	  space	  in	  which	  she	  can	  enjoy	  the	  freedom	  to	  lead	  her	  life	  however	  she	  sees	  fit.	  	  However,	  some	  philosophers	  question	  whether	  the	  freedom	  self-­‐ownership	  secures	  is	  meaningful.	  	  In	  this	  thesis,	  I	  will	  consider	  G.A.	  Cohen’s	  argument	  that	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  is	  in	  fact	  hostile	  to	  autonomy	  and	  freedom.	  	  Cohen	  argues	  that	  the	  self-­‐seeking	  self-­‐ownership	  allows	  will	  generate	  “propertyless	  proletarians”	  who	  do	  not	  enjoy	  any	  meaningful	  sense	  of	  autonomy	  over	  the	  course	  of	  their	  lives.	  	  Robert	  Nozick	  –	  on	  whose	  Anarchy,	  State,	  and	  Utopia	  I	  will	  focus	  my	  discussion	  primarily	  because	  Cohen	  does	  –	  defends	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  against	  this	  line	  of	  argument	  by	  claiming	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  gives	  a	  person	  all	  the	  freedom	  she	  can	  want	  without	  sacrificing	  her	  basic	  rights	  over	  her	  body.	  	  I	  will	  first	  show	  how	  Cohen’s	  argument	  can	  be	  reformulated	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  negative	  liberty;	  the	  idea	  is	  that	  the	  negative	  freedom	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  secures	  is	  insufficient	  to	  protect	  genuine1	  freedom.	  	  	  	  However,	  Nozick	  says	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  are	  basic.	  	  This	  means	  that	  even	  if	  the	  negative	  freedom	  self-­‐ownership	  protects	  isn’t	  meaningful,	  Cohen’s	  argument	  doesn’t	  show	  that	  a	  libertarian	  like	  Nozick	  should	  agree	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  ought	  to	  be	  curbed	  in	  favor	  of	  freedom.	  	  You	  can’t	  tax	  my	  income	  to	  help	  the	  worst	  off	  because	  I	  have	  a	  right	  to	  do	  with	  my	  body	  –	  and	  my	  income	  –	  as	  I	  please,	  and	  that	  right	  is	  inviolable.	  	  Cohen’s	  argument	  will	  succeed	  in	  this	  regard	  only	  if	  he	  can	  first	  show	  that	  the	  libertarian	  conceives	  of	  the	  right	  to	  freedom,	  understood	  in	  a	  way	  more	  robust	  than	  simple	  negative	  liberty.	  	  If	  the	  libertarian	  takes	  that	  to	  be	  at	  least	  as	  basic	  as	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  and	  the	  negative	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  I	  will	  use	  “genuine,”	  “true,”	  “robust,”	  and	  “meaningful”	  interchangeably	  when	  applied	  to	  freedom.	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  liberty	  it	  allows,	  then	  when	  Cohen	  shows	  that	  such	  robustly	  understood	  freedom	  is	  threatened	  by	  self-­‐ownership,	  he	  will	  have	  made	  his	  case	  against	  Nozick.	  	  I	  will	  thus	  suggest	  a	  way	  to	  interpret	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  such	  that	  freedom	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  function	  of	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  I	  will	  try	  to	  show	  that	  the	  animating	  principle	  behind	  the	  intuition	  that	  I	  own	  myself	  and	  the	  fruits	  of	  my	  labor	  is	  a	  eudaimonistic	  belief	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  flourishing.	  	  Furthermore,	  I	  will	  show	  that	  this	  underlying	  normative	  belief	  aims	  to	  protect	  a	  meaningful	  (robust)	  sort	  of	  freedom,	  and	  that	  this	  clashes	  with	  Nozick’s	  claim	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  are	  basic.	  	  Cohen’s	  argument	  is	  saved,	  I	  believe,	  by	  exposing	  these	  normative	  commitments	  and	  showing	  that	  both	  Nozick	  and	  Cohen	  value	  freedom	  for	  similar	  reasons.	   	  
Self-­ownership	  and	  freedom	  
	  G.A.	  Cohen	  distinguishes	  between	  the	  concept	  and	  the	  thesis	  of	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  The	  concept	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  specifies	  a	  reflexive	  relation	  between	  what	  is	  owned	  and	  the	  owner	  such	  that	  a	  person	  owns	  himself	  and	  his	  powers	  (Self-­ownership,	  Freedom,	  and	  
Equality,	  69).	  	  John	  Locke	  endorses	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  concept:	  “Every	  Man	  has	  a	  Property	  in	  his	  own	  Person	  [so	  that]	  no	  Body	  has	  any	  Right	  to	  but	  himself”	  (Two	  Treatises,	  II,	  sec.	  27).	  	  Cohen	  thinks	  the	  concept	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  coherent.	  	  The	  libertarian	  thesis	  of	  self-­‐ownership,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  claims	  that	  each	  person	  enjoys	  full	  and	  exclusive	  moral	  rights	  of	  control	  and	  use	  over	  himself	  and	  his	  powers,	  and	  that	  he	  therefore	  owes	  no	  service	  to	  anyone	  outside	  of	  a	  contract	  (Cohen,	  67-­‐69).	  	  The	  thesis	  derives	  its	  explanatory	  power	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  property.	  	  Libertarians	  believe	  individuals	  have	  self-­‐ownership	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  rights	  in	  the	  same	  way	  they	  have	  property	  rights	  in	  things.	  	  As	  Nozick	  puts	  it,	  a	  property	  right	  in	  X	  is	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  what	  shall	  be	  done	  with	  X	  (Anarchy,	  State,	  and	  Utopia,	  171).	  	  When	  this	  understanding	  of	  property	  is	  applied	  to	  one’s	  own	  person,	  it	  seems	  to	  follow	  that	  one	  has	  the	  right	  to	  determine	  what	  shall	  be	  done	  with	  one’s	  person,	  as	  well	  as	  the	  further	  right	  to	  reap	  the	  benefits	  of	  one’s	  labor.	  	  To	  illustrate	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis,	  G.A.	  Cohen	  compares	  it	  to	  slave-­‐ownership:	  in	  the	  same	  way	  a	  slave	  owner	  is	  entitled	  to	  dispose	  of	  a	  slave	  as	  he	  pleases,	  a	  self-­‐owner	  is	  entitled	  to	  dispose	  of	  himself	  however	  he	  pleases	  (Cohen,	  68).	  Nozick	  thinks	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  gives	  us	  freedom	  because	  it	  entails	  “side-­‐constraints”	  on	  how	  we	  treat	  others	  that	  respect	  the	  ability	  of	  people,	  as	  self-­‐owners,	  to	  lead	  their	  own	  lives	  (Nozick,	  34).	  	  Since	  nobody	  else	  can	  rightfully	  claim	  property	  in	  one’s	  product	  or	  body,	  libertarian	  side-­‐constraints	  against	  force	  respect	  each	  person’s	  freedom	  to	  pursue	  her	  own	  goals.	  	  The	  right	  to	  do	  with	  your	  person,	  like	  the	  right	  to	  do	  with	  any	  other	  property,	  is	  constrained	  by	  the	  same	  rights	  others	  have,	  which	  are	  intended	  to	  preserve	  the	  inviolability	  of	  human	  beings	  (Nozick,	  171).	  	  A	  person	  cannot	  place	  his	  knife	  just	  wherever	  he	  pleases.	  	  For	  example,	  I	  cannot	  place	  my	  knife	  in	  another	  person’s	  chest.	  	  A	  certain	  kind	  of	  consequentialist	  might	  argue	  that	  this	  action	  is	  prohibited	  on	  the	  grounds	  that	  it	  does	  not	  maximize	  	  “social	  utility.”	  	  A	  libertarian	  rejects	  this	  kind	  of	  thinking.	  	  	  Nozick	  argues	  that	  the	  reason	  placing	  my	  knife	  in	  another’s	  chest	  is	  prohibited	  is	  because	  doing	  so	  fails	  to	  respect	  the	  inviolability	  and	  separateness	  of	  the	  person	  and	  therefore	  violates	  the	  right	  she	  has	  to	  do	  with	  her	  body	  as	  she	  wishes,	  and	  lead	  her	  own	  life	  
	   	   	  	   	  4	  	  as	  she	  pleases	  (34).2	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  rights	  correlate	  with	  others’	  duties	  not	  to	  interfere	  with	  what	  a	  person	  owns.	  	  Since	  the	  rights	  of	  each	  person	  ought	  to	  be	  respected,	  the	  respect	  for	  those	  rights	  sets	  constraints	  on	  my	  actions.	  	  Nozick	  therefore	  argues	  for	  side-­‐constraints	  on	  one’s	  actions	  so	  that	  they	  do	  not	  violate	  another’s	  rights	  to	  lead	  her	  life	  according	  to	  her	  plans.	  	  Side-­‐constraints	  on	  actions,	  unlike	  end-­‐state	  maximizing	  views	  (such	  as	  certain	  brands	  of	  socialism),	  are	  not	  open	  to	  utilitarian	  considerations.	  	  They	  are	  not	  override-­‐able	  for	  any	  reason,	  no	  matter	  how	  appealing.	  	  The	  nonaggression	  principle	  indicates	  what	  these	  side-­‐constraints	  are.	  	  It	  simply	  prohibits	  physical	  or	  paternalistic	  aggression	  against	  another	  person,	  so	  that	  one	  may	  neither	  physically	  harm	  another,	  nor	  threaten	  force	  in	  order	  to	  benefit	  the	  person	  being	  threatened	  (33).	  	  The	  nonaggression	  principle	  is	  based	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  individuals	  are	  distinct,	  inviolable,	  self-­‐owners.	  	  	  What	  is	  the	  principle	  that	  justifies	  these	  side-­‐constraints?	  	  For	  Nozick,	  applying	  side-­‐constraints	  on	  how	  we	  treat	  people	  is	  justified	  precisely	  because	  people	  possess	  certain	  characteristics	  that	  are	  valuable	  enough	  to	  require	  protection	  (Nozick,	  48).	  	  Nozick	  identifies	  three	  such	  valuable	  features	  of	  a	  person:	  The	  ability	  to	  “formulate	  long-­‐term	  plans	  for	  [one’s]	  life;”	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  for	  oneself	  a	  picture	  of	  “what	  an	  appropriate	  life	  is	  for	  [oneself]	  and	  others;”	  and	  the	  ability	  to	  regulate	  and	  guide	  one’s	  life	  accordingly	  (49).	  	  These	  characteristics,	  Nozick	  claims,	  are	  morally	  important	  because	  the	  capacity	  to	  shape	  one’s	  life	  according	  to	  some	  overall	  plan	  is	  integral	  to	  the	  pursuit	  of	  meaning	  in	  one’s	  life	  (50).	  	  Side-­‐constraints	  against	  interference	  therefore	  work	  to	  protect	  this	  meaning-­‐giving	  ability,	  and	  it	  is	  this	  principle	  that	  justifies	  side-­‐constraints	  against	  interference.	  	  Of	  course,	  for	  each	  person	  to	  have	  such	  a	  meaning-­‐giving	  capacity,	  she	  ought	  to	  be	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  2	  For	  more	  libertarian	  reasons	  to	  reject	  end-­‐state	  arguments	  that	  support	  using	  others	  for	  maximizing	  social	  utility,	  or	  “the	  greater	  good,”	  see	  Nozick,	  pp.	  32-­‐3.	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autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  the	  formulation	  of	  her	  life’s	  plans.	  	  (I	  will	  return	  to	  this	  justification	  for	  side-­‐constraints	  later	  in	  this	  thesis.	  	  For	  now,	  it	  serves	  to	  support	  the	  view	  that	  self-­‐ownership,	  for	  Nozick,	  preserves	  autonomy.)	  	   Libertarianism	  connects	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  human	  autonomy	  and	  freedom	  because	  the	  moral	  right	  against	  either	  physical	  or	  paternalistic	  aggression	  derived	  from	  the	  right	  to	  full	  and	  exclusive	  property	  in	  one’s	  person	  as	  a	  self-­‐owner	  allows	  a	  person	  the	  ability	  to	  lead	  her	  life	  as	  she	  sees	  fit.	  	  The	  moral	  fact	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  thus	  grants	  a	  person	  autonomous	  control	  over	  her	  life.	  	  In	  this	  way,	  libertarianism	  is	  defended	  as	  a	  liberty-­‐preserving	  political	  theory,	  and	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  defended	  as	  a	  liberty-­‐preserving	  principle.	  	  
Is	  self-­ownership	  hostile	  to	  autonomy?	  
	  The	  claim	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  a	  freedom-­‐promoting	  principle	  is	  not	  uncontested.	  	  Many	  egalitarians	  and	  other	  liberals	  find	  the	  claim	  problematic.	  	  The	  source	  of	  the	  trouble	  is	  that	  libertarians	  believe	  the	  side	  constraints	  laid	  out	  above	  are	  sufficient	  for	  respecting	  the	  inviolability	  of	  an	  individual.	  	  Egalitarians	  do	  not	  think	  they	  are	  sufficient.	  	  As	  they	  argue,	  the	  libertarian	  system	  ties	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  to	  rights	  in	  external	  resources	  and	  this	  seems	  to	  lead	  to	  conflicts	  between	  self-­‐ownership	  and	  freedom.	  Nozick	  thinks	  that	  a	  person	  who	  properly	  uses	  his	  powers	  as	  a	  self-­‐owner	  can	  legitimately	  come	  to	  own,	  in	  addition	  to	  himself,	  an	  indefinite	  unequal	  distribution	  of	  external	  resources	  (Cohen,	  69).	  	  Additionally,	  each	  person	  has	  both	  “control	  rights”	  over	  his	  person	  and	  “income	  rights”	  over	  the	  results	  of	  his	  labor	  (Nozick,	  171).	  I	  will	  call	  this	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  understanding	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  that	  contains	  both	  control	  and	  income	  rights	  full	  self-­
ownership.	  	  Applying	  the	  nonaggression	  principle	  to	  this	  wide	  sphere	  that	  includes	  both	  control	  over	  one’s	  body	  and	  control	  over	  the	  products	  of	  one’s	  labor,	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  entails	  that	  a	  person	  not	  only	  has	  the	  right	  to	  do	  with	  his	  person	  as	  he	  pleases;	  he	  also	  has	  the	  right	  to	  reap	  all	  of	  the	  rewards	  of	  his	  work	  (i.e.,	  the	  income	  from	  assets).	  	  Thus,	  no	  one	  may	  interfere	  with	  a	  person’s	  body,	  private	  property	  or	  income.	  	  Nozick	  famously	  writes,	  “Taxation	  of	  earnings	  from	  labor	  is	  on	  par	  with	  forced	  labor”	  (169).	  	  Redistributive	  taxation,	  he	  argues,	  undermines	  a	  person’s	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  and	  gives	  another	  partial	  ownership	  rights	  in	  the	  taxpayer.	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  rights,	  therefore,	  protect	  any	  inequality	  of	  condition;	  removing	  property	  or	  earned	  income	  from	  a	  person	  is	  just	  as	  much	  a	  violation	  of	  his	  basic	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  as	  removing	  his	  left	  arm.	  Nozick	  believes	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  protect	  an	  inequality	  of	  condition	  while	  preserving	  the	  inviolability	  of	  the	  individual,	  but	  it	  appears	  to	  egalitarians	  that	  the	  libertarian	  side	  constraints	  self-­‐ownership	  demands	  are	  insufficient	  to	  protect	  genuine	  human	  autonomy.	  	  Egalitarians	  think	  Nozick’s	  position	  undermines	  autonomy	  because	  it	  allows	  for	  some	  persons	  who,	  by	  the	  fruits	  of	  their	  labor,	  come	  to	  own	  most	  of	  all	  of	  the	  capital	  or	  resources	  in	  an	  area	  (because	  resources	  are	  scarce),	  which	  will	  have	  the	  effect	  of	  effectively	  forcing	  the	  others	  who	  own	  little	  or	  no	  capital	  or	  resources	  to	  either	  sell	  their	  labor	  power	  or	  die.	  	  Such	  a	  choice	  does	  not	  accord	  with	  any	  meaningful	  sense	  of	  autonomy,	  they	  say.	  	  The	  gross	  inequality	  of	  condition	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  promotes	  will	  generate	  some	  people	  who	  are	  worse	  off	  and	  less	  free	  than	  others.	  	  They	  conclude	  that	  libertarian	  constraints	  are	  not	  sufficient	  for	  preserving	  human	  autonomy.	  	  Thus,	  egalitarians	  think	  that	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  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  not	  only	  fails	  to	  preserve	  autonomy	  in	  all	  cases,	  but	  that	  it	  actually	  tends	  to	  undermine	  it.	  I	  think	  self-­‐ownership	  can	  rightly	  be	  attacked	  along	  these	  lines.	  	  Specifically,	  I	  find	  that	  G.A.	  Cohen’s	  argument	  on	  pages	  236-­‐8	  in	  Freedom,	  Self-­ownership,	  and	  Equality	  is	  a	  convincing	  one.	  	  There,	  Cohen	  argues	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  hostile	  to	  autonomy	  because	  “the	  self-­‐seeking	  authorized	  by	  self-­‐ownership	  generates	  propertyless	  proletarians	  whose	  life	  prospects	  are	  too	  confined	  for	  them	  to	  enjoy	  the	  control	  of	  a	  substantial	  kind	  over	  their	  lives	  that	  answers	  the	  idea	  of	  autonomy”	  (237).	  	  His	  argument	  stipulates	  that	  a	  person	  is	  
autonomous	  only	  if	  he	  “has	  a	  variety	  of	  acceptable	  options	  available	  to	  him	  to	  choose	  from,	  and	  his	  life	  became	  as	  it	  is	  through	  his	  choice	  of	  some	  of	  these	  options”	  (238).	  	  The	  reason	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  appealing,	  says	  Cohen,	  is	  that	  it	  promises	  us	  this	  understanding	  of	  autonomy;	  furthermore,	  libertarians	  like	  Robert	  Nozick	  intend	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  secure	  such	  a	  substantive	  kind	  of	  freedom,	  where	  a	  person	  has	  autonomous	  control	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  life	  (Nozick,	  30-­‐3	  48-­‐51,	  171).	  	  However,	  since	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  requires	  that	  each	  person	  have	  the	  exclusive	  right	  to	  privately	  own	  and	  exchange	  the	  fruits	  of	  his	  talents	  on	  an	  open	  market,	  and	  since	  people	  are	  born	  with	  varying	  degrees	  of	  talents,	  self-­‐ownership	  will	  in	  fact	  lead	  to	  some	  individuals	  becoming	  abject	  proletarians	  who	  enjoy	  all	  of	  the	  legal	  rights	  guaranteed	  by	  self-­‐ownership	  but	  are	  forced	  to	  either	  sell	  their	  labor	  power	  to	  those	  who	  own	  a	  large	  share	  of	  the	  available	  resources,	  or	  die	  (Cohen,	  100).	  	  Because	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  hostile	  to	  autonomy,	  Cohen	  arrives	  at	  the	  conclusion	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  should	  be	  restricted	  in	  favor	  of	  genuine	  human	  freedom	  and	  autonomy.	  Before	  I	  continue,	  I	  should	  note	  an	  objection	  Michael	  Otsuka	  raises	  to	  the	  very	  conflict	  between	  freedom	  and	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Considering	  the	  conflict	  between	  self-­‐
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  rights	  and	  an	  egalitarian	  principle	  of	  equality	  of	  opportunity,	  Otsuka	  says	  that	  an	  egalitarian	  principle	  does	  not	  necessarily	  conflict	  with	  the	  libertarian	  right	  to	  self-­‐ownership	  because	  nothing	  Nozick	  says	  about	  self-­‐ownership	  implies	  that	  rights	  over	  worldly	  resources	  are	  as	  “robust”	  as	  rights	  over	  our	  bodies	  and	  labor	  power.	  	  According	  to	  Otsuka,	  this	  explains	  why	  Nozick’s	  argument	  against	  redistributive	  taxation	  is	  weak:	  it	  presupposes	  a	  premise	  that	  grants	  a	  self-­‐owner	  as	  robust	  a	  right	  over	  external	  resources	  as	  her	  right	  over	  herself.	  	  However,	  Nozick’s	  argument	  is	  in	  fact	  “premised	  upon	  a	  right	  against	  being	  used	  as	  a	  means	  by	  being	  forced…to	  sacrifice	  life,	  limb,	  or	  labor.	  	  It	  is	  not	  premised	  upon	  a	  right	  against	  harmful	  incursions	  upon	  one’s	  body	  simpliciter”	  (Otsuka,	  
Libertarianism	  Without	  Inequality,	  14).	  	  It	  also,	  Otsuka	  says,	  explains	  why	  G.A.	  Cohen	  is	  incorrect	  in	  thinking	  that	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  necessarily	  conflict	  with	  any	  egalitarian	  principle	  covering	  external	  resources.	  	  One	  may	  retain	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  without	  claiming	  equally	  robust	  rights	  over	  external	  resources	  that	  would	  limit	  their	  availability	  to	  others	  and	  undermine	  their	  equality	  of	  opportunity.	  By	  Otsuka’s	  lights,	  then,	  there	  is	  no	  inherent	  conflict	  between	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  and	  the	  meaningful	  freedom	  Cohen	  wants.	  	  For,	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  only	  grant	  a	  person	  robust	  rights	  over	  her	  body	  and	  labor	  power;	  rights	  over	  worldly	  resources	  that	  could	  restrict	  the	  freedom	  of	  others	  are	  not	  necessarily	  included.	  	  If	  there	  is	  a	  conflict	  between	  self-­‐ownership	  and	  freedom,	  it	  rests	  on	  the	  same	  mistaken	  premise	  as	  Nozick’s	  argument	  against	  redistributive	  taxation	  –	  that	  a	  self-­‐owner	  has	  a	  right	  over	  external	  resources	  as	  robust	  as	  her	  right	  over	  herself.	  Otsuka’s	  objection	  immediately	  diffuses	  the	  conflict	  fueling	  Cohen’s	  argument.	  	  Why	  continue	  talking	  about	  Cohen’s	  argument	  then?	  	  Generally	  speaking,	  I	  find	  Otsuka’s	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  resolution	  attractive	  as	  a	  means	  for	  retaining	  what’s	  appealing	  about	  self-­‐ownership	  without	  excluding	  a	  means	  for	  achieving	  equality	  (or	  freedom).	  	  However,	  I	  think	  Nozick	  actually	  defends	  a	  version	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  that	  grants	  equally	  robust	  rights	  over	  external	  resources	  as	  over	  our	  bodies	  and	  labor	  power	  (Nozick,	  171).	  	  In	  Otsuka’s	  terms,	  he	  is	  happy	  to	  affirm	  a	  stringent	  right	  to	  income.	  	  Whether	  or	  not,	  he	  is	  justified	  in	  thinking	  that	  income	  rights	  follow	  from	  control	  rights	  is	  another	  question.	  3	  	  I	  want	  to	  see	  how	  Nozick’s	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  fares	  against	  Cohen’s	  argument.	  	  
Freedom	  and	  Objections	  to	  Cohen’s	  Argument	  
	  For	  Cohen,	  autonomy	  is	  a	  condition	  of	  genuine	  freedom.	  	  The	  possession	  of	  autonomy	  meaningfully	  contributes	  to	  a	  person’s	  freedom	  only	  if	  it	  grants	  him	  control	  over	  his	  preferences	  and	  desires.	  	  This	  control	  is	  not	  captured	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  restraint:	  not	  only	  must	  a	  person	  be	  unrestrained	  to	  act	  as	  he	  does	  –	  his	  action	  must	  genuinely	  be	  up	  to	  him.	  	  Cohen	  seems	  to	  be	  echoing	  an	  argument	  made	  by	  Joseph	  Raz.	  	  Raz	  argues	  that	  if	  leading	  an	  autonomous	  life	  is	  an	  ultimate	  value,	  “then	  having	  a	  sufficient	  range	  of	  acceptable	  options	  is	  of	  intrinsic	  value,	  for	  it	  is	  constitutive	  of	  an	  autonomous	  life	  that	  it	  is	  lived	  in	  circumstances	  where	  acceptable	  alternatives	  are	  present”	  (Raz,	  The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  205).	  	  A	  person	  who	  spends	  his	  life	  fighting	  starvation	  and	  disease	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  autonomous	  because	  he	  lacks	  the	  opportunity	  to	  accomplish	  anything	  besides	  staying	  alive.	  	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  I	  borrow	  the	  distinction	  between	  “control	  rights”	  and	  “income	  rights”	  from	  John	  Christman.	  	  Control	  rights	  include	  the	  rights	  to	  possess,	  use,	  manage,	  alienate	  and	  transfer	  property;	  income	  rights	  apply	  to	  a	  wider	  sphere	  that	  also	  includes	  the	  rights	  to	  income	  from	  assets	  (Self-­ownership,	  Equality,	  and	  the	  Structure	  of	  Property	  Rights,	  29).	  
	   	   	  	   	  10	  	  The	  ideal	  of	  personal	  autonomy,	  according	  to	  Raz,	  “requires	  not	  merely	  the	  presence	  of	  options	  but	  of	  acceptable	  ones”	  (205).	  Now,	  the	  kind	  of	  freedom	  self-­‐ownership	  promotes	  is	  negative.	  	  In	  order	  to	  respect	  your	  self-­‐ownership	  rights,	  the	  non-­‐aggression	  principle	  functions	  to	  impose	  a	  duty	  on	  others	  against	  interfering	  in	  your	  moral	  sphere.	  	  Negative	  freedom	  is	  just	  the	  absence	  of	  external	  obstacles	  or	  constraints.	  	  Freedom	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  a	  lack	  of	  interference	  from	  others.	  	  Charles	  Taylor	  calls	  negative	  theories	  of	  freedom	  opportunity	  concepts	  –	  whether	  or	  not	  we	  exercise	  our	  options,	  being	  free	  simply	  depends	  on	  what	  we	  can	  do	  given	  the	  options	  available	  to	  us	  (Taylor,	  “What’s	  Wrong	  With	  Negative	  Liberty,”	  213).	  Cohen’s	  argument	  ties	  what	  I	  call	  meaningful	  autonomy	  to	  a	  positive	  conception	  of	  freedom.	  4	  	  	  In	  contrast	  to	  negative	  theories,	  positive	  theories	  define	  freedom	  in	  terms	  of	  exercising	  control	  over	  one’s	  life.	  	  Free	  agents	  must	  be	  self-­‐governing.	  	  Positive	  theories	  of	  freedom	  are	  exercise	  concepts.	  	  Under	  a	  positive	  conception,	  freedom	  is	  tied	  up	  with	  individual	  self-­‐governance	  such	  that	  a	  person	  is	  free	  only	  if	  she	  has	  autonomously	  determined	  the	  shape	  of	  her	  life	  (Taylor,	  213).	  	  The	  defining	  feature	  of	  positive	  theories,	  according	  to	  Taylor,	  is	  that	  they	  “discriminate	  between	  motivations”	  in	  a	  way	  that	  negative	  theories	  do	  not	  (217).	  	  What	  this	  means	  is	  that	  positive	  theories	  do	  not	  ignore	  the	  various	  internal	  and	  external	  motivations	  responsible	  for	  acting.	  	  Because	  being	  free	  in	  a	  positive	  sense	  requires	  that	  a	  person	  exercise	  the	  control	  over	  her	  life,	  a	  positive	  theory	  of	  freedom,	  unlike	  a	  negative	  theory,	  cannot	  only	  consider	  external	  obstacles	  to	  free	  action.	  	  There	  are	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  4	  Isaiah	  Berlin	  distinguishes	  between	  these	  two	  concepts	  of	  freedom	  in	  “Two	  Concepts	  of	  Liberty,”	  1969,	  but	  as	  A.J.	  Cohen	  notes,	  Benjamen	  Constant	  made	  the	  distinction	  earlier,	  talking	  about	  the	  liberty	  of	  the	  ancients	  and	  the	  liberty	  of	  the	  moderns.	  	  I	  will	  not	  enter	  the	  debate	  about	  the	  usefulness	  of	  the	  distinction	  in	  this	  paper.	  	  For	  my	  purposes,	  the	  reader	  should	  assume	  that	  the	  distinction	  is	  useful.	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internal	  as	  well	  as	  external	  obstacles	  that	  can	  prevent	  action	  and	  fetter	  a	  person.	  	  For	  example,	  say	  I	  am	  addicted	  to	  cigarettes	  but	  wish	  to	  quit.	  	  I	  may	  walk	  wherever	  I	  please	  this	  afternoon,	  but	  my	  decision	  to	  walk	  to	  the	  nearest	  store	  selling	  cigarettes	  is	  internally	  constrained	  by	  my	  addiction,	  at	  least	  to	  some	  degree,	  in	  spite	  of	  there	  being	  no	  external	  obstacles	  forcing	  my	  path.	  	  In	  order	  for	  me	  to	  realize	  my	  goal	  to	  quit	  smoking	  I	  need	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  refuse	  my	  internal	  desire	  for	  nicotine.	  	  Thus,	  I	  am	  free	  only	  if	  I	  am	  motivated	  by	  the	  right	  reasons	  (217).	  The	  positive/negative	  freedom	  distinction	  helps	  to	  clarify	  Cohen’s	  position.	  	  We	  can	  recast	  his	  argument	  as	  a	  critique	  of	  negative	  liberty,	  which	  asserts	  that	  a	  positive	  conception	  ought	  to	  be	  adopted	  because	  it	  accords	  with	  the	  self-­‐government	  and	  autonomy	  that	  we	  value	  about	  being	  free.	  	  As	  the	  case	  of	  the	  propertyless	  proletarian	  shows,	  freedom	  is	  meaningful	  only	  when	  a	  person	  has	  the	  conditions	  available	  to	  him	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  his	  life’s	  plan.	  	  Cohen	  thus	  argues	  that	  presenting	  freedom	  merely	  as	  an	  opportunity	  concept,	  as	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  does,	  is	  insufficient	  for	  self-­‐governance.	  	  For,	  some	  people	  remain	  un-­‐free	  in	  the	  meaningful,	  positive	  sense	  even	  without	  the	  external	  obstacles	  that	  the	  non-­‐aggression	  principle	  prevents.	  	  The	  non-­‐aggression	  principle	  can’t	  secure	  the	  conditions	  genuine	  freedom	  requires.	  	  Cohen	  concludes	  that	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  is	  not	  liberty	  promoting.	  Now,	  as	  Taylor	  points	  out,	  a	  critique	  of	  negative	  freedom	  need	  only	  show	  that	  pure	  opportunity	  concepts	  are	  insufficient	  for	  true	  freedom.	  	  The	  critique	  does	  not	  commit	  one	  to	  a	  belief	  about	  the	  form	  of	  society	  or	  government	  under	  which	  true	  freedom	  obtains	  (217).	  	  Cohen’s	  critique	  does	  not	  tie	  freedom	  to	  any	  particular	  form	  of	  society,	  so	  his	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  argument	  cannot	  be	  attacked	  based	  on	  features	  about	  the	  society	  required	  to	  uphold	  true	  freedom.	  Additionally,	  we	  do	  not	  need	  to	  follow	  Marx,	  Rousseau	  and	  others	  who	  tie	  positive	  concepts	  of	  freedom	  to	  collective,	  political	  participation.	  	  John	  Christman	  advocates	  a	  kind	  of	  positive	  freedom	  that	  applies	  to	  individuals.	  	  The	  only	  requirement	  we	  need	  to	  add	  to	  a	  negative	  conception	  in	  order	  to	  get	  individual	  positive	  freedom	  is	  that	  a	  person	  possesses	  the	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐government	  and	  is	  guided	  to	  act	  by	  reasons	  that	  are	  her	  own	  (Christman,	  Liberalism	  and	  Positive	  Freedom,	  345).	  	  Ignoring	  collective	  notions	  of	  the	  positive	  concept	  helps	  us	  focus	  on	  ways	  that	  the	  negative	  concept	  supported	  by	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  is	  unable	  to	  secure	  individual	  freedom.	  Cohen’s	  argument	  implies	  that	  for	  the	  propertyless	  proletariat,	  some	  actions	  are	  not	  really	  up	  to	  him,	  or	  freely	  chosen.	  	  For	  an	  action	  to	  be	  freely	  chosen	  is	  for	  it	  to	  be	  the	  result	  of	  the	  kind	  of	  autonomous	  control	  Cohen	  describes,	  as	  I’ve	  discussed	  above.	  	  An	  action	  is	  un-­‐free	  if	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  place	  limits	  on	  one’s	  available	  opportunities.5	  	  My	  choosing	  to	  work	  at	  the	  chicken	  factory,	  for	  instance,	  is	  not	  a	  freely	  made	  choice	  if	  that	  is	  the	  only	  local	  work	  available,	  I	  would	  rather	  make	  creative	  art	  than	  break	  chickens’	  necks	  all	  day,	  and	  my	  options	  have	  somehow	  been	  limited	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  so	  that	  my	  most	  rationally	  attractive	  choice	  is	  working	  at	  the	  chicken	  factory.	  	  Nozick	  anticipates	  this	  line	  of	  attack.	  	  In	  response	  to	  it,	  he	  argues	  that	  whether	  I	  perform	  an	  action	  non-­‐voluntarily	  due	  to	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  5	  Nozick	  thinks	  that	  whether	  a	  person’s	  actions	  are	  voluntary	  “depends	  on	  what	  it	  is	  that	  limits	  his	  alternatives.	  	  If	  facts	  of	  nature	  do	  so,	  the	  actions	  are	  voluntary”	  (262).	  	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  this,	  so	  I	  only	  consider	  the	  possibility	  of	  another’s	  actions	  rendering	  some	  action	  non-­‐voluntary.	  	  First,	  it	  is	  difficult	  to	  imagine	  an	  argument	  showing	  how	  acts	  of	  nature	  negatively	  affect	  autonomy;	  second,	  it’s	  clear	  that	  Cohen’s	  argument	  focuses	  its	  energies	  on	  “the	  self-­‐seeking”	  that	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  authorizes.	  	  Broadening	  the	  scope	  of	  his	  argument	  to	  include	  acts	  of	  nature	  would	  only	  complicate	  things.	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  a	  limitation	  that	  has	  been	  placed	  on	  my	  available	  opportunities	  by	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  “depends	  upon	  whether	  these	  others	  had	  the	  right	  to	  act	  as	  they	  did”	  (Nozick,	  262).	  	  This	  is	  his	  historical	  theory	  of	  entitlement.	  	  If	  the	  others	  had	  a	  right	  to	  act	  as	  they	  did	  –	  that	  is,	  if	  they	  did	  not	  infringe	  on	  my	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  and	  nothing	  they	  did	  arose	  from	  an	  unjust	  distribution	  –	  then	  whatever	  resulting	  decision	  I	  am	  limited	  to	  may	  still	  be	  deemed	  free	  from	  coercion,	  even	  if	  I	  would	  prefer	  to	  do	  something	  else.	  	  	  As	  an	  example,	  Nozick	  asks	  us	  to	  consider	  the	  case	  of	  worker	  Z,	  who	  is	  like	  Cohen’s	  propertyless	  proletarian.	  	  Z	  faces	  the	  choice	  of	  working	  for	  those	  who	  own	  all	  of	  the	  capital	  in	  the	  area	  or	  starving:	  “[The]	  actions	  of	  all	  other	  persons	  do	  not	  add	  up	  to	  providing	  Z	  with	  some	  other	  option”	  (263).	  	  Yet,	  even	  though	  Cohen	  may	  see	  the	  situation	  as	  one	  in	  which	  Z	  is	  forced	  to	  choose	  non-­‐voluntarily	  to	  work	  instead	  of	  starving,	  Nozick	  defends	  such	  effects	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  according	  to	  their	  historical	  basis.	  	  If	  the	  other	  individuals	  A	  through	  Y	  acted	  within	  their	  rights,	  then	  no	  matter	  how	  limited	  Z’s	  options	  may	  be,	  or	  undesirable	  his	  remaining	  options,	  his	  resulting	  choice	  is	  free	  and	  uncoerced	  because	  no	  injustice	  was	  done	  in	  the	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  his	  decision.	  	  Nozick	  states,	  “A	  person’s	  choice	  among	  differing	  degrees	  of	  unpalatable	  alternatives	  is	  not	  rendered	  nonvoluntary	  by	  the	  fact	  that	  others	  voluntarily	  chose	  and	  acted	  within	  their	  rights	  in	  a	  way	  that	  did	  no	  provide	  him	  with	  a	  more	  palatable	  alternative”	  (264).	  Nozick’s	  reply	  depends	  on	  the	  importance	  we	  place	  upon	  historical	  considerations	  in	  determining	  the	  degree	  of	  autonomy	  a	  person	  has.	  	  If	  Z’s	  freedom	  depends	  entirely	  on	  what	  has	  happened	  to	  make	  it	  so	  that	  Z’s	  options	  are	  limited,	  and	  all	  that	  has	  happened	  to	  put	  Z	  in	  his	  unfortunate	  position	  is	  the	  result	  of	  a	  just	  distribution,	  the	  historical	  view	  purports	  that	  Z’s	  rights	  have	  not	  been	  violated	  and	  Z	  may	  be	  said	  to	  enjoy	  all	  the	  freedom	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  he	  is	  rightfully	  bound	  to	  enjoy	  (Nozick,	  152).	  	  However,	  such	  historical	  considerations	  do	  not	  carry	  weight	  for	  an	  egalitarian	  like	  Cohen.	  	  If	  genuine	  autonomy	  places	  requirements	  on	  decisions	  such	  that	  acceptable	  or	  palatable	  alternatives	  are	  available	  to	  a	  person	  regardless	  of	  the	  historical	  process	  leading	  up	  to	  his	  decision,	  no	  account	  of	  the	  distribution	  responsible	  for	  his	  situation	  supports	  the	  claim	  that	  Z	  is	  autonomous,	  or	  that	  Z	  acts	  freely.	  	  How	  are	  we	  to	  decide	  between	  Nozick’s	  historical	  account	  and	  the	  egalitarian’s	  conception	  of	  genuine	  autonomy?	  I	  am	  inclined	  to	  agree	  with	  Cohen	  that	  autonomy	  is	  only	  meaningful	  for	  a	  person	  if	  it	  provides	  him	  with	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  alternatives	  to	  choose	  between.	  	  However,	  if	  we	  claim	  that	  Cohen’s	  sense	  of	  autonomy	  ought	  to	  outweigh	  Nozick’s	  historical	  entitlement	  theory	  of	  justice,	  it	  may	  be	  objected	  that	  we	  aren’t	  dealing	  with	  Nozick	  on	  his	  own	  terms.	  For	  Nozick,	  Z’s	  rights	  as	  a	  self-­owner	  have	  not	  been	  violated;	  no	  aggression	  has	  been	  committed	  against	  him.	  	  We	  have	  no	  reason	  to	  believe	  that	  Nozick	  intends	  to	  secure	  for	  Z	  autonomous	  control	  even	  close	  to	  what	  would	  be	  needed	  on	  Cohen’s	  understanding	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  non-­‐aggression	  principle	  is	  only	  meant	  to	  secure	  each	  person	  the	  
opportunity	  to	  exercise	  control	  over	  his	  decisions,	  and	  this	  legal	  negative	  right	  is	  the	  most	  libertarians	  believe	  a	  just	  government	  can	  enforce	  without	  encroaching	  on	  others’	  rights	  as	  self-­‐owners.	  	  On	  this	  rights-­‐based	  view	  of	  autonomy,	  where	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  serve	  to	  protect	  opportunity,	  a	  person	  is	  autonomous	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  his	  rights	  have	  not	  been	  violated.	  	   George	  Brenkert	  objects	  to	  Cohen	  along	  these	  lines.	  	  In	  his	  review	  of	  Cohen’s	  Self-­
ownership,	  Brenkert	  says	  Cohen	  weakens	  his	  argument	  by	  failing	  to	  address	  the	  same	  kind	  of	  autonomy	  that	  Nozick	  aims	  to	  preserve.	  	  In	  Brenkert’s	  estimation,	  Nozick	  understands	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  the	  relationship	  between	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  differently	  than	  Cohen	  does.	  	  In	  Nozick’s	  system,	  we	  have	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  (and	  side-­‐constraints)	  we	  do	  by	  virtue	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  shape	  and	  control	  our	  lives,	  whereas	  Cohen,	  Brenkert	  thinks,	  is	  operating	  with	  an	  understanding	  of	  autonomy	  where	  we	  have	  the	  rights	  we	  do	  in	  order	  to	  have	  this	  ability	  (Brenkert,	  Self-­ownership,	  Freedom,	  and	  Autonomy,	  42).	  	  So	  Nozick’s	  autonomy	  is	  captured	  by	  the	  rights	  of	  self-­‐control	  every	  person	  has	  while	  Cohen	  conceives	  of	  autonomy	  independently	  of	  these	  rights,	  in	  terms	  of	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices.	  	  Thus,	  self-­‐ownership	  threatens	  autonomy	  for	  Cohen	  but	  not	  for	  Nozick,	  because	  for	  Nozick,	  there	  is	  no	  independent	  measure	  –	  i.e.,	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices	  –	  we	  can	  use	  to	  appraise	  how	  autonomous	  a	  person	  is.	  	  For	  Nozick,	  a	  person	  is	  autonomous	  just	  because	  she	  has	  the	  ability,	  or	  opportunity,	  to	  shape	  her	  life	  as	  she	  sees	  fit;	  how	  successful	  she	  is	  in	  
exercising	  that	  ability	  is	  beside	  the	  point	  so	  long	  as	  the	  right	  side-­‐constraints	  are	  in	  place	  to	  protect	  her	  opportunity.	  One	  reason	  Brenkert	  seems	  to	  think	  Cohen	  is	  talking	  past	  Nozick	  is	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  appear	  to	  be	  basic	  in	  Nozick’s	  system.	  	  Cohen’s	  argument	  rests	  on	  the	  belief	  that	  the	  right	  to	  autonomy	  is	  ethically	  prior	  to	  the	  right	  to	  non-­‐aggression	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  entails.	  	  For	  Cohen,	  autonomy	  grounds	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  so	  that	  there	  is	  an	  independent	  measure	  we	  can	  use	  to	  appraise	  how	  autonomous	  a	  person	  is	  outside	  of	  the	  self-­‐control	  rights	  self-­‐ownership	  affords.	  	  So	  Brenkert	  is	  saying	  that	  while	  Cohen	  shows	  that	  autonomy	  is	  integral	  to	  self-­‐ownership,	  he	  does	  not	  show	  that	  Nozick	  
grounds	  the	  latter	  in	  the	  former.	  	  That	  is,	  he	  does	  not	  first	  demonstrate	  that	  Nozick	  does	  not	  consider	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  be	  basic,	  or	  axiomatic.	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   A	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  is	  axiomatic	  if	  no	  deeper	  reasons	  can	  or	  need	  to	  be	  given	  for	  its	  acceptance.	  	  If	  Nozick	  believes	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  axiomatic,	  he	  thinks	  that	  no	  deeper	  considerations	  than	  that	  an	  individual’s	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  can	  limit	  the	  actions	  of	  others	  and	  protect	  an	  individual’s	  freedom	  (Nozick,	  57).	  	  Since	  for	  Nozick	  autonomy	  is	  captured	  by	  self-­‐ownership,	  which	  is	  axiomatic,	  but	  for	  Cohen	  autonomy	  is	  independently	  conceived,	  Brenkert	  concludes	  that	  Cohen’s	  argument	  fails	  to	  convince	  because	  Cohen	  fails	  to	  show	  that	  self-­‐ownership,	  understood	  as	  a	  basic	  right,	  undermines	  autonomy.	  Now,	  Brenkert’s	  objection	  only	  holds	  water	  if	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  indeed	  basic.	  	  If	  libertarians	  like	  Nozick	  value	  self-­‐ownership	  for	  deeper	  reasons	  –	  reasons	  based	  in	  the	  importance	  of	  human	  autonomy,	  for	  instance	  –	  Cohen’s	  argument	  stands	  up.	  	  So	  long	  as	  we	  agree	  with	  him	  that	  genuine	  autonomy	  requires	  a	  range	  of	  acceptable	  options	  available	  to	  choose	  from,	  we	  can	  conclude	  that	  since	  Nozick’s	  system	  does	  not	  protect	  genuine	  autonomy,	  it	  should	  be	  rejected.	  However,	  Cohen	  in	  fact	  believes	  that	  for	  Nozick	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  basic	  and	  freedom	  is	  derivative:	  “The	  primary	  commitment	  of	  his	  philosophy	  is	  not	  to	  liberty	  but	  to	  the	  thesis	  of	  self-­‐ownership”	  (Cohen,	  68).	  	  Libertarianism,	  he	  says,	  does	  not	  aim	  at	  freedom	  generally	  but	  at	  a	  certain	  kind	  of	  freedom	  “whose	  shape	  is	  delineated”	  by	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  This	  seems	  to	  present	  a	  problem	  for	  Cohen’s	  argument.	  	  If	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  basic,	  the	  case	  of	  the	  propertyless	  proletarian	  –	  similarly,	  the	  case	  of	  Z	  –	  may	  show	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  undermines	  genuine	  freedom.	  	  But	  it	  does	  not	  provide	  any	  reason	  for	  a	  libertarian	  to	  conceive	  of	  or	  prefer	  a	  sense	  of	  freedom	  above	  that	  which	  self-­‐ownership	  secures.	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  gives	  us	  all	  the	  freedom	  we	  can	  rightfully	  expect	  to	  have	  as	  self-­‐owners.	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  of	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  freedom	  won’t	  get	  off	  the	  ground	  unless	  it	  can	  first	  be	  shown	  that	  Nozick	  thinks	  the	  right	  to	  freedom	  is	  at	  least	  as	  basic	  as	  the	  right	  to	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  We	  saw	  earlier	  that	  for	  Nozick	  freedom	  is	  derivative	  of	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  However	  I	  think	  Cohen’s	  argument	  succeeds	  because	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  is	  justified	  such	  that	  meaningful	  autonomy	  is	  held	  as	  a	  basic	  human	  right.	  	  Nozick’s	  justification	  for	  capitalist	  inequality	  and	  the	  non-­‐aggression	  principle,	  I	  will	  suggest,	  is	  based	  on	  deeper	  normative	  considerations	  than	  the	  basic	  right	  to	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  is	  not	  an	  axiom:	  it	  is	  defended	  based	  on	  eudaimonistic	  reasons	  for	  securing	  freedom.	  	  
Self-­ownership	  and	  Eudaimonia	  	   	  One	  way	  to	  see	  the	  normative	  underpinnings	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  by	  observing	  how	  Nozick	  defends	  the	  moral	  form	  of	  libertarian	  side	  constraints	  against	  utilitarian	  views.	  	  The	  argument	  supporting	  libertarian	  rights	  focuses,	  he	  says,	  on	  the	  fact	  that	  each	  individual	  has	  his	  own	  life	  to	  lead	  (Nozick,	  34).	  	  Libertarian	  constraints	  truly	  respect	  the	  separateness	  of	  persons,	  thereby	  allowing	  each	  individual	  to	  lead	  his	  own	  life	  and	  pursue	  his	  own	  ends	  so	  that	  “no	  one	  may	  be	  sacrificed	  for	  others”	  (33).	  	  Nozick	  is	  following	  Kant	  here.	  	  Kant’s	  second	  formulation	  of	  the	  categorical	  imperative	  states	  that	  we	  ought	  to	  treat	  the	  humanity	  in	  others	  and	  ourselves	  as	  an	  end	  in	  itself	  and	  not	  merely	  as	  a	  means	  (Kant,	  Groundwork,	  30-­‐1).	  	  Nozick	  thinks	  libertarian	  constraints	  reflect	  the	  Kantian	  imperative	  (Nozick,	  30).	  	  Thus,	  end-­‐state	  maximizing	  views	  that	  maintain	  certain	  positive	  rights	  in	  things	  can’t	  
	   	   	  	   	  18	  	  respect	  the	  separateness	  of	  persons	  because	  they	  sacrifice	  individual	  interests	  for	  others’	  benefit.	  	   What	  exactly	  constitutes	  being	  “sacrificed”	  for	  another?	  	  The	  justification	  of	  libertarian	  side-­‐constraints	  ties	  into	  discussions	  of	  harm.	  	  What’s	  the	  basis	  for	  thinking	  that	  taxation	  harms	  an	  individual	  taxpayer	  but	  capitalist	  appropriations	  do	  not	  harm	  worker	  Z?	  	  How	  Nozick	  understands	  harm	  evaluations	  should	  explain	  what	  normative	  beliefs,	  in	  any,	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  in	  based	  upon.	  In	  his	  paper	  “The	  Prescriptive	  Impotence	  of	  Self-­‐Ownership,”	  Evan	  Fox-­‐Decent	  argues	  that	  Nozick	  appeals	  to	  deeper	  normative	  resources	  to	  justify	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  The	  non-­‐aggression	  principle	  (the	  “do	  not	  harm	  principle”)	  embedded	  in	  self-­‐ownership,	  he	  thinks,	  is	  justified	  not	  on	  the	  basis	  of	  any	  basic	  right	  to	  property	  in	  oneself	  that	  correlates	  to	  a	  duty	  on	  others	  against	  interference.	  	  Rather,	  it	  depends	  on	  welfare	  considerations	  which	  themselves	  depend	  on	  normative	  considerations.	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  committed	  to	  what	  Fox-­‐Decent	  calls	  the	  “common-­‐sense”	  notion	  of	  harm.	  	  The	  common-­‐sense	  notion	  says	  that	  someone	  is	  harmed	  only	  if	  he	  is	  made	  worse	  off	  than	  he	  otherwise	  would	  have	  been.	  	  This	  goes	  for	  direct	  physical	  aggression	  as	  well	  as	  appropriations	  of	  private	  property.	  	  Nozick	  bases	  his	  discussion	  of	  private	  property	  and	  harm	  on	  Locke’s	  proviso	  on	  the	  appropriation	  of	  unowned	  resources.	  	  Locke’s	  proviso	  requires	  that	  “enough	  and	  as	  good”	  be	  left	  in	  common	  for	  others	  (Two	  Treatises	  of	  
Government,	  sect.	  27).	  	  Nozick	  follows	  Locke	  in	  thinking	  that	  a	  proviso	  on	  appropriation	  is	  required	  to	  ensure	  that	  private	  property	  acquisitions,	  like	  physical	  actions,	  do	  not	  harm	  others.	  	  However,	  Nozick	  perhaps	  differs	  from	  Locke,	  as	  he	  believes	  that	  that	  moral	  side	  constraints	  set	  by	  the	  rights	  of	  others	  dictate	  that	  any	  appropriation	  is	  legitimate	  if,	  and	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  only	  if,	  the	  situation	  of	  those	  who	  have	  now	  lost	  the	  liberty	  to	  use	  the	  thing	  is	  not	  worsened	  (Nozick,	  178).	  	  Nozick	  understands	  a	  person’s	  situation	  being	  “worsened”	  in	  a	  weaker	  sense	  than	  some	  authors	  attribute	  to	  Locke.6	  	  It’s	  unclear	  what	  the	  “enough	  and	  as	  good”	  clause	  requires.	  	  As	  Nozick	  points	  out,	  someone	  may	  be	  made	  worse	  off	  in	  two	  ways:	  first,	  by	  losing	  the	  opportunity	  to	  benefit	  from	  the	  resource,	  and	  second,	  by	  no	  longer	  being	  able	  to	  use	  the	  resource.	  	  Nozick	  thinks	  the	  first	  requirement	  is	  too	  strong	  for	  a	  workable	  theory	  of	  justice	  (178).	  To	  clarify	  Nozick’s	  point,	  let’s	  return	  to	  the	  case	  of	  worker	  Z.	  	  That	  Z	  no	  longer	  has	  the	  freedom	  to	  use	  some	  resource	  that	  Y	  has	  appropriated	  only	  makes	  Z	  worse	  off	  if	  his	  situation	  is	  worsened	  as	  a	  result	  of	  no	  longer	  being	  able	  to	  use	  that	  resource.	  	  Supposing	  Z	  earns	  the	  same	  wages	  he	  would	  have	  earned	  before	  persons	  A	  through	  Y	  appropriated	  the	  resources	  he	  could	  have	  used,	  he	  is	  not	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  their	  appropriations	  and	  capitalist	  development.	  	  Nozick	  says	  that	  his	  proviso	  rules	  out	  the	  stronger	  requirement	  on	  harm	  because	  no	  appropriate	  baseline	  against	  which	  to	  measure	  a	  loss	  of	  opportunity	  can	  be	  fixed	  (177).	  	  If	  we	  say	  that	  Z	  is	  made	  worse	  off	  by	  the	  capitalist	  appropriation	  of	  the	  surrounding	  resources,	  and	  by	  “worse	  off”	  we	  really	  mean	  that	  Z	  has	  lost	  some	  opportunity	  to	  benefit	  from	  those	  resources,	  how	  do	  we	  determine	  the	  degree	  of	  harm	  inflicted	  upon	  him	  relative	  to	  his	  opportunity?	  	  We	  can	  only	  look	  to	  his	  current	  situation,	  Nozick	  claims,	  to	  fix	  a	  baseline	  for	  harm	  evaluations.	  Harm	  evaluations	  depend	  on	  welfare	  considerations.	  	  To	  say	  that	  Z	  is	  not	  harmed	  by	  
A’s	  appropriation	  is	  to	  weigh	  Z’s	  welfare	  before	  the	  appropriation	  against	  his	  welfare	  after	  the	  appropriation	  and	  find	  the	  two	  situations	  equivalent	  in	  the	  weak	  sense	  that	  Z	  is	  no	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  See	  Jeremy	  Waldron’s	  “Enough	  and	  as	  Good	  Left	  For	  Others.”	  
	   	   	  	   	  20	  	  worse	  off	  despite	  having	  lost	  the	  liberty	  to	  use	  the	  resource	  and	  despite	  having	  limited	  opportunities	  for	  future	  benefit.	  	  However,	  Nozick	  offers	  no	  further	  discussion	  about	  the	  exact	  nature	  of	  welfare.	  	  What	  exactly	  should	  we	  look	  for	  in	  Z’s	  situation?	  	  There	  certainly	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  “common-­‐sense”	  understanding	  of	  welfare	  that	  we	  could	  employ	  here,	  where	  
Z’s	  welfare	  describes	  the	  state	  of	  Z’s	  quality	  of	  life	  understood	  in	  terms	  of	  health	  and	  wealth.	  	  Nozick	  appears	  to	  assume	  this	  understanding	  when	  he	  says	  that	  his	  proviso	  on	  property	  acquisition	  forbids	  both	  a	  land-­‐owner	  from	  ordering	  a	  castaway	  off	  his	  island	  and	  a	  person	  from	  appropriating	  the	  only	  water	  hole	  in	  a	  desert	  and	  charging	  whatever	  he	  pleases	  for	  others	  to	  use	  it	  (180).	  	  In	  both	  cases,	  those	  affected	  by	  the	  appropriation	  are	  obviously	  harmed	  under	  the	  common-­‐sense	  view	  since	  their	  health	  is	  at	  stake.	  This	  common-­‐sense	  understanding	  of	  welfare	  can	  only	  do	  so	  much	  work,	  though.	  	  In	  cases	  where	  subjects’	  health	  and	  wealth	  are	  not	  so	  obviously	  jeopardized,	  more	  is	  needed	  to	  fill	  out	  the	  content	  of	  welfare	  in	  order	  to	  make	  a	  harm	  evaluation.	  	  Fox-­‐Decent	  thinks	  that	  Nozick	  cannot	  set	  the	  baseline	  for	  comparison	  at	  a	  person’s	  actual	  level	  of	  welfare	  for	  an	  appropriation	  because	  cases	  exist	  where	  a	  person’s	  health	  and	  wealth	  remain	  untouched	  but	  we	  still	  wouldn’t	  want	  to	  say	  that	  an	  appropriation	  causes	  no	  harm.	  	  He	  imagines	  a	  community	  of	  slaves	  abandoned	  by	  their	  masters.	  	  If	  we	  are	  evaluating	  harm	  as	  Nozick	  does,	  we	  set	  their	  welfare	  baseline	  –	  their	  actual	  welfare	  –	  at	  their	  former	  position	  in	  slavery.	  	  By	  Nozick’s	  lights,	  then,	  we	  could	  put	  them	  all	  back	  into	  slavery	  without	  harming	  them.	  	  This,	  Fox-­‐Decent	  thinks,	  is	  a	  counter-­‐intuitive	  conclusion,	  which	  shows	  that	  Nozick’s	  notion	  of	  harm	  is	  misguided	  and	  that	  his	  understanding	  of	  welfare	  is	  too	  thin	  to	  be	  meaningful	  (Fox-­‐Decent,	  497).	  	  More	  needs	  to	  be	  said	  about	  the	  nature	  of	  welfare	  to	  fix	  a	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  baseline	  that	  actually	  allows	  us	  to	  make	  meaningful	  evaluations	  about	  whether	  an	  action	  or	  an	  appropriation	  causes	  harm.	  	   According	  to	  Fox-­‐Decent,	  since	  it’s	  counter-­‐intuitive	  to	  say	  that	  placing	  the	  slaves	  back	  into	  slavery	  isn’t	  harming	  them,	  we	  need	  to	  adjust	  our	  notion	  of	  harm.	  	  If	  we	  say	  that	  placing	  the	  slaves	  back	  into	  slavery	  is	  making	  them	  worse	  off,	  the	  baseline	  we	  are	  working	  with	  clearly	  specifies	  something	  richer	  than	  Nozick’s	  thin	  account	  of	  their	  actual	  level	  of	  health	  and	  wealth.	  	  Fox-­‐Decent	  thinks	  that	  we	  normally	  make	  harm	  evaluations	  against	  a	  belief	  about	  “so-­‐called	  normal	  conditions.”	  	  To	  specify	  just	  what	  counts	  as	  normal,	  he	  says,	  we	  necessarily	  employ	  normative	  considerations	  (497).	  	  For	  example,	  one	  who	  objects	  to	  placing	  the	  community	  of	  slaves	  back	  into	  slavery	  does	  so	  because	  of	  a	  normative	  belief	  that	  might	  set	  a	  liberal,	  democratic	  society	  as	  the	  standard;	  Ancient	  Egyptians	  would	  not	  share	  the	  same	  normative	  beliefs	  about	  the	  value	  of	  human	  autonomy	  and	  what	  society	  ought	  to	  look	  like	  and	  so	  might	  not	  object.	  	  Thus,	  Fox-­‐Decent	  pulls	  normative	  considerations	  into	  harm	  evaluations	  and	  proposes	  a	  “normative	  view	  of	  harm,”	  where	  we	  determine	  a	  person’s	  level	  of	  welfare,	  he	  says,	  by	  first	  employing	  normative	  considerations	  about	  the	  kind	  of	  life	  we	  deem	  decent.	  	  For	  example,	  we	  may	  draw	  on	  Western	  democratic	  ideals	  as	  the	  standard	  against	  which	  we	  find	  slavery	  harmful.	  	  According	  to	  this	  view,	  “Someone	  is	  harmed	  only	  if	  they	  are	  not	  as	  well	  off	  as	  they	  ought	  to	  be,	  given	  the	  appropriate	  normative	  theory	  and	  available	  resources”	  (Fox-­‐Decent,	  498).	  Now,	  it	  may	  not	  be	  necessary	  to	  follow	  Fox-­‐Decent	  in	  thinking	  that	  we	  need	  to	  employ	  normative	  considerations	  to	  fix	  an	  adequate	  baseline	  for	  making	  harm	  evaluations.	  	  	  In	  Joel	  Feinberg’s	  view,	  an	  event	  counts	  as	  harm	  against	  a	  person	  only	  if	  it	  wrongly	  sets	  back	  her	  interests	  (Holtung,	  “The	  Harm	  Principle,”	  373).	  	  Her	  interests	  are	  constituted	  by	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  her	  basic	  desires	  or	  goals.	  	  A	  basic	  desire	  or	  goal	  is	  one	  that	  is	  “intrinsic,	  general	  and	  such	  as	  to	  explain	  and	  give	  meaning	  to	  more	  particular	  desires	  and	  activities”	  (373).	  	  For	  example,	  the	  desire	  to	  become	  a	  teacher	  is	  basic,	  whereas	  the	  desire	  to	  write	  a	  paper	  is	  not.	  	  So	  an	  event	  harms	  a	  person	  if	  it	  takes	  away	  the	  means	  required	  for	  her	  to	  pursue	  her	  goals.	  	  	  	   On	  this	  account	  of	  harm,	  one	  does	  harm	  to	  the	  group	  of	  slaves	  by	  not	  releasing	  them	  because	  by	  remaining	  captive,	  the	  group	  of	  slaves	  further	  lacks	  the	  ability	  to	  pursue	  their	  goals.	  	  On	  this	  view,	  the	  baseline	  for	  assessing	  welfare	  is	  set	  relative	  to	  a	  person’s	  most	  important	  desires	  and	  goals	  such	  that	  we	  seem	  to	  be	  in	  a	  position	  to	  make	  meaningful	  harm	  evaluations.	  	  If	  we	  apply	  Feinberg’s	  view	  of	  harm	  to	  Nozick’s	  system	  we	  avoid	  the	  counter-­‐intuitive	  conclusion	  that	  keeping	  a	  group	  of	  slaves	  in	  captivity	  does	  not	  constitute	  harming	  them.	  	  Thus,	  the	  baseline	  can	  be	  adjusted	  without	  adjusting	  the	  notion	  of	  harm.	  	   However,	  I	  think	  Nozick	  in	  fact	  rests	  his	  harm	  evaluations	  on	  normative	  considerations.	  	  And	  it	  is	  worth	  determining	  whether	  Fox-­‐Decent	  is	  right	  and	  Nozick	  really	  ought	  to	  pull	  in	  normative	  considerations	  to	  fill	  out	  his	  welfare	  evaluations,	  because	  those	  normative	  considerations,	  I	  believe,	  reveal	  the	  eudaimonistic	  basis	  of	  self-­‐ownership.	  So,	  continuing	  with	  Fox-­‐Decent’s	  argument,	  if	  he	  is	  correct	  that	  Nozick	  cannot	  rely	  merely	  on	  his	  common-­‐sense	  view	  of	  harm	  to	  determine	  whether	  some	  appropriation	  or	  other	  –	  or	  any	  action	  –	  is	  harmful,	  he	  must	  appeal	  to	  an	  underlying	  normative	  structure	  to	  do	  so.	  	  What,	  then,	  are	  the	  normal	  conditions	  Nozick	  envisions	  when	  he	  says	  that	  each	  person	  as	  a	  rightful	  self-­‐owner	  has	  a	  right	  to	  pursue	  his	  own	  ends?	  	  And	  what	  moral	  beliefs	  fill	  out	  the	  description	  of	  these	  normal	  conditions	  such	  that	  keeping	  somebody	  from	  pursuing	  his	  own	  ends	  counts	  as	  harming	  him?	  	  Again,	  I	  believe	  Nozick’s	  justification	  of	  side-­‐constraints	  answers	  these	  questions	  for	  us.	  
	   	   	  	   	  23	  	   Recall	  that	  the	  side-­‐constraints	  on	  how	  we	  are	  to	  treat	  others	  are	  justified	  in	  virtue	  of	  certain	  characteristics	  of	  persons.	  	  Specifically,	  they	  are	  justified	  in	  virtue	  of	  our	  ability	  to	  shape	  our	  lives	  according	  to	  an	  overall	  plan	  of	  our	  creation	  and	  hence	  give	  meaning	  to	  our	  lives.	  	  Nozick	  thinks	  we	  ought	  to	  be	  treated	  in	  a	  way	  that	  respects	  the	  kind	  of	  beings	  we	  are	  (Nozick,	  49).	  	  The	  following	  individuating	  features	  define	  beings	  of	  our	  kind:	  (1)	  the	  ability	  to	  formulate	  long-­‐term	  plans	  for	  our	  lives;	  (2)	  the	  ability	  to	  determine	  for	  ourselves	  an	  abstract	  picture	  of	  what	  an	  appropriate	  life	  is	  for	  us;	  and	  (3)	  the	  ability	  to	  guide	  and	  regulate	  our	  lives	  in	  accordance	  with	  (2)	  (Nozick,	  49).	  	  Nozick	  believes	  the	  moral	  side-­‐constraints	  that	  the	  minimal	  state	  upholds	  respect	  what	  it	  is	  about	  us	  that	  makes	  our	  lives	  worth	  protecting.	  	  Our	  ability	  to	  form	  a	  picture	  of	  our	  lives	  and	  to	  act	  according	  to	  an	  overall	  conception	  of	  the	  life	  we	  want	  to	  live	  is	  morally	  important	  because	  the	  possession	  of	  that	  ability	  is	  necessary	  for	  the	  pursuit	  of	  meaning	  in	  our	  lives	  (50).	  So,	  Nozick’s	  moral	  side-­‐constraints	  are	  justified	  in	  virtue	  of	  what	  makes	  us	  human	  persons	  and	  the	  features	  that	  make	  us	  human	  (the	  ability	  to	  plan,	  regulate	  and	  guide	  our	  lives)	  are	  morally	  important,	  and	  therefore	  worth	  preserving,	  because	  they	  allow	  us	  to	  strive	  for	  meaningful	  lives.	  	  This	  meaning	  is	  left	  up	  to	  each	  person	  to	  decide,	  according	  to	  his	  ability	  to	  determine	  what	  an	  appropriate	  life	  for	  himself	  and	  others	  ought	  to	  look	  like.	  	  Side-­‐constraints	  are	  justified	  because	  each	  person	  ought	  to	  remain	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  this	  meaning-­‐giving	  ability.	  	  Each	  individual	  is	  distinct,	  and	  each	  has	  his	  own	  life	  to	  lead	  (34).	  	  If	  another	  person	  interferes	  with	  your	  ability	  to	  strive	  for	  a	  meaningful	  life,	  or	  if	  you	  are	  an	  amnesiac	  who	  forgets	  the	  happenings	  of	  the	  previous	  day	  every	  evening	  as	  you	  sleep,	  you	  no	  longer	  possess	  the	  ability	  to	  shape	  your	  life	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning.	  7	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Nozick,	  49	  
	   	   	  	   	  24	  	   Although	  Nozick	  does	  not	  endorse	  any	  deeper	  normative	  beliefs	  than	  self-­‐ownership	  rights,	  I	  think	  we	  can	  ascribe	  normative	  beliefs	  that	  undergird	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  and	  the	  minimal	  state,	  and	  which	  help	  strengthen	  his	  argument.	  	  The	  normatively	  acceptable	  political	  system	  that	  Nozick	  envisions	  is	  one	  in	  which	  people	  are	  not	  only	  free	  to	  lead	  their	  own	  lives,	  but	  also	  free	  to	  act	  on	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning.	  	  Another	  way	  to	  put	  it,	  as	  Nozick	  does,	  is	  that	  individuals	  are	  distinct,	  “each	  with	  his	  own	  life	  to	  lead,”	  and	  “each	  with	  his	  own	  life	  to	  lead”	  (34).	  	  Being	  free	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning	  in	  one’s	  life	  is	  a	  taller	  order	  than	  just	  being	  free	  to	  lead	  one’s	  own	  life.	  	  Simply	  being	  free,	  in	  the	  negative	  sense,	  to	  lead	  one’s	  own	  life	  may	  correlate	  to	  a	  purely	  formal	  self-­‐ownership	  right	  where	  one	  in	  fact	  lacks	  the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning.	  	  Consider,	  for	  example,	  Cohen’s	  propertyless	  proletarian.	  	  He	  is	  negatively	  free	  while	  lacking	  the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  a	  meaningful	  life.	  So	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  for	  Nozick	  there	  are	  normative	  considerations	  at	  work	  that	  stress	  self-­‐control	  and	  the	  achievement	  of	  meaning	  in	  our	  lives.	  	  These	  normative	  beliefs	  are	  eudaimonistic.	  	  Thus,	  fostering	  human	  flourishing	  –	  the	  perfection	  of	  one’s	  talents,	  abilities	  and	  virtues	  –	  is	  the	  goal	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  upheld	  in	  Nozick’s	  minimal	  state.8	  	  This	  flourishing	  is	  what	  explains	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy	  and	  freedom.	  	  Why	  should	  we	  be	  free	  to	  pursue	  our	  various	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good?	  	  Why	  is	  it	  so	  important	  that	  I	  be	  free	  to	  learn,	  value	  and	  choose	  my	  own	  ends?	  	  Some	  ethical	  consideration	  must	  be	  at	  work	  to	  explain	  the	  
value	  of	  autonomy.	  	  Respect	  for	  human	  freedom	  is	  what	  motivates	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  A	  normative	  theory	  is	  eudaimonistic	  if	  it	  aims	  at	  achieving	  eudaimonia,	  which	  we	  can	  define	  (perhaps	  roughly)	  as	  “flourishing.”	  	  Such	  a	  view	  defines	  some	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  identifies	  or	  relates	  the	  exercise	  or	  achievement	  of	  that	  good	  with	  the	  eudaimon	  life.	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  thesis;	  but	  without	  any	  deeper	  ethical	  consideration	  supporting	  that	  position,	  respecting	  autonomy	  versus,	  say,	  reason,	  is	  arbitrary.	  	  Eudaimonism,	  I	  believe,	  comes	  into	  the	  picture	  here.	  	  	   My	  claim	  is	  that	  a	  eudaimonistic	  framework	  ought	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis.	  	  A	  person	  flourishes	  by	  exercising	  self-­‐governance	  and	  self-­‐mastery	  in	  the	  pursuit	  of	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  such	  that	  he	  gives	  meaning	  to	  his	  life.	  	  A	  necessary	  constituent	  of	  flourishing	  is	  being	  autonomous	  with	  respect	  to	  one’s	  choices	  so	  that	  one’s	  pursuit	  of	  the	  good	  is	  entirely	  his	  own.	  	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  the	  moral	  importance	  of	  flourishing	  explains	  the	  importance	  of	  autonomy	  and	  in	  turn	  explains	  just	  why	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  valuable.	  	  	  My	  argument	  rests	  on	  Nozick’s	  discussion	  of	  intrinsic	  human	  characteristics	  that	  justify	  how	  we	  treat	  others	  and	  why	  we	  ought	  to	  respect	  their	  inviolable	  rights	  to	  non-­‐interference.	  	  Might	  this	  argument,	  however,	  be	  flawed	  for	  claiming	  that	  the	  individuating	  features	  of	  humans	  (the	  ability	  to	  plan	  and	  regulate	  our	  lives	  according	  to	  our	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good)	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  features	  we	  hold	  as	  morally	  important	  for	  flourishing?	  	  What	  about	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  features	  are	  unique	  to	  humans	  makes	  them	  capable	  of	  grounding	  the	  moral	  conclusion	  that	  human	  flourishing	  should	  promote	  our	  ability	  to	  plan	  and	  regulate	  our	  lives	  according	  to	  our	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good?	  	  It	  may	  be	  said	  that	  my	  argument	  adopts	  the	  Aristotelian	  view	  of	  flourishing.	  	  Aristotle	  believes	  that	  the	  appropriate	  form	  of	  flourishing	  for	  anything	  is	  determined	  by	  what	  is	  unique	  to	  that	  thing.	  	  This	  applies	  equally	  to	  humans	  as	  it	  does	  to	  vegetables:	  each	  has	  some	  special	  property	  that	  marks	  its	  function	  and	  thus	  determines	  its	  mode	  of	  flourishing	  (Nozick,	  
Philosophical	  Explanations,	  516).	  
	   	   	  	   	  26	  	   Nozick	  rejects	  this	  Aristotelian	  position	  because	  uniqueness,	  he	  says,	  is	  not	  enough	  to	  ground	  moral	  conclusions	  about	  the	  flourishing	  appropriate	  to	  humans.	  	  It’s	  not	  clear	  that	  anything	  ought	  to	  depend	  on	  a	  property’s	  being	  special	  because	  it’s	  not	  clear	  that	  some	  moral	  conclusion	  that	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  “Man	  has	  P”	  ought	  to	  follow	  once	  it	  is	  determined	  that	  “Man	  has	  P,	  and	  nothing	  else	  has	  P”	  (516).	  	  From	  this	  line	  of	  argument,	  Nozick	  concludes:	  “If	  some	  conclusion	  about	  the	  flourishing	  appropriate	  to	  man	  follows	  from	  his	  having	  a	  certain	  property,	  surely	  it	  is	  in	  virtue	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  that	  property,	  not	  because	  other	  being	  do	  not	  possess	  it”	  (516).	  	  “The	  problem	  with	  the	  Aristotelian	  framework,”	  he	  says,	  “is	  that	  a	  special	  property	  need	  not	  be	  an	  especially	  valuable	  one.	  	  Yet	  surely	  what	  should	  flourish	  are	  your	  valuable	  characteristics,	  especially	  if	  their	  exercise	  constitutes	  further	  value”	  (517).	  Does	  this	  constitute	  an	  objection	  to	  my	  claim	  that	  a	  eudaimonistic	  framework	  –	  which	  emphasizes	  human	  flourishing	  –	  ought	  to	  serve	  as	  the	  foundation	  of	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis?	  	  I	  don’t	  believe	  it	  does.	  Nozick	  finds	  fault	  with	  the	  Aristotelian	  framework	  due	  to	  its	  focus	  on	  specialness.	  	  But	  special	  properties	  need	  not	  be	  those	  that	  flourish.	  	  As	  Nozick	  notes,	  we	  can	  instead	  say	  that	  valuable	  characteristics	  should	  flourish.	  	  Instead	  of	  pointing	  to	  human	  abilities	  to	  plan	  and	  regulate	  our	  lives	  and	  achieve	  meaning	  as	  unique	  and	  therefore	  capable	  of	  serving	  as	  the	  basis	  for	  moral	  conclusions	  about	  the	  appropriate	  flourishing	  for	  humans,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  those	  same	  abilities	  ought	  to	  flourish	  because	  they’re	  valuable.	  	  We	  can	  reject	  Aristotle’s	  argument	  based	  in	  specialness	  and	  still	  uphold	  a	  eudaimonistic	  theory	  that,	  instead	  of	  identifying	  special	  properties,	  points	  to	  properties	  in	  humans	  that	  are	  valuable	  as	  determining	  the	  appropriate	  form	  of	  flourishing.	  
	   	   	  	   	  27	  	  	   In	  fact,	  just	  this	  approach	  may	  be	  taking	  place	  in	  Nozick’s	  justification	  of	  the	  non-­‐aggression	  principle.	  	  The	  ability	  to	  shape	  our	  lives	  according	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  may	  or	  may	  not	  be	  special	  to	  humans;	  but	  the	  specialness	  of	  the	  ability	  seems	  to	  be	  beside	  the	  point	  for	  Nozick.	  	  Our	  life-­‐shaping	  ability	  is	  an	  important	  property	  –	  one	  that	  ought	  to	  ground	  how	  we	  treat	  others	  –	  because	  it	  is	  valuable,	  i.e.,	  because	  it	  gives	  our	  lives	  meaning	  (Nozick,	  50).	  Nozick’s	  focus	  on	  human	  autonomy	  supports	  the	  view	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  valued	  because	  of	  an	  underlying	  eudaimonistic	  commitment.	  	  The	  reason	  autonomy	  is	  valuable	  enough	  for	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  protect	  is	  because	  human	  flourishing	  is	  implicitly	  assumed,	  and	  taken	  as	  a	  fundamental	  moral	  goal.	  	  Autonomy	  is	  a	  necessary	  constituent	  of	  the	  good	  life	  since	  the	  good	  life	  is	  defined	  in	  terms	  of	  each	  person’s	  ability	  to	  pursue	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good.	  	  The	  eudaimon	  life	  as	  Nozick	  understands	  it	  requires	  that	  one	  possess	  the	  freedom	  to	  develop	  and	  pursue	  one’s	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good,	  with	  the	  eudaimon	  life	  understood	  broadly	  to	  encompass	  a	  plurality	  of	  conceptions.	  	  The	  telos	  of	  human	  life,	  just	  as	  it	  was	  for	  the	  ancients,	  is	  flourishing	  –	  so	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis,	  I	  contend,	  is	  accepted	  because	  it	  respects	  and	  values	  human	  flourishing	  as	  the	  end	  of	  life.	  	  Thus,	  the	  moral	  importance	  of	  flourishing	  explains	  why	  autonomy	  is	  so	  highly	  prized,	  and	  in	  turn	  why	  self-­‐ownership	  grants	  inviolable	  rights	  to	  noninterference	  such	  that	  a	  person’s	  right	  to	  a	  substantive	  kind	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  protected.	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Meaningful	  Freedom	  
	  If	  I	  am	  right	  that	  a	  eudaimonistic	  moral	  theory	  grounds	  Nozick’s	  argument,	  one	  thing	  this	  does	  is	  help	  Cohen	  answer	  the	  objection	  that	  his	  argument	  will	  fail	  to	  win	  over	  a	  libertarian	  because	  the	  libertarian	  takes	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  to	  be	  basic	  and	  rights	  to	  autonomy	  as	  derivative.	  	  If	  what	  I’m	  suggesting	  holds	  water	  and	  a	  eudaimonistic	  theory	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  support	  self-­‐ownership,	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  not	  basic.	  	  For,	  being	  free	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning,	  where	  this	  freedom	  gives	  self-­‐ownership	  its	  value,	  seems	  to	  commit	  Nozick	  to	  a	  definition	  of	  autonomous	  freedom	  that	  is	  conceived	  independently	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  and	  can	  be	  independently	  appraised.	  	  Thus,	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  can	  be	  shown	  to	  be	  freedom	  undermining	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  a	  person	  fails	  to	  be	  genuinely	  free	  and	  autonomous.	  The	  freedom	  self-­‐ownership	  aims	  to	  protect	  with	  a	  eudaimonistic	  foundation	  is	  clearly	  not	  negative.	  	  That	  a	  person	  be	  free	  to	  pursue	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  cannot	  be	  construed	  as	  a	  negative	  right	  if	  freedom	  is	  understood	  as	  a	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐governance	  and	  self-­‐mastery.	  	  For	  being	  free,	  in	  the	  negative	  sense,	  to	  lead	  one’s	  own	  life	  may	  correlate	  to	  a	  purely	  formal	  self-­‐ownership	  right	  where	  one	  in	  fact	  lacks	  the	  genuine	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  strive	  for	  meaning.	  A	  libertarian	  may	  object	  that	  the	  negative	  freedom	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  affords	  captures	  all	  of	  the	  opportunity	  to	  act	  on	  one’s	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  that	  matters.	  	  What	  matters	  is	  not	  that	  a	  person	  succeeds	  in	  acting	  on	  his	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  possessing	  the	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐governance;	  instead,	  what	  matters	  is	  that	  he	  has	  the	  opportunity	  to	  do	  so,	  and	  a	  negative	  conception	  of	  freedom	  secures	  this	  opportunity.	  	  
	   	   	  	   	  29	  	  Nozick	  grounds	  libertarian	  rights	  to	  non-­‐interference	  in	  our	  capacity	  to	  shape	  and	  pursue	  meaningful	  lives;	  he	  does	  not	  claim	  that	  we	  need	  more	  rights	  in	  order	  to	  enhance	  this	  life-­‐shaping	  capacity.	  	  Cohen	  is	  making	  the	  latter	  claim.	  	  Thus,	  for	  Nozick,	  there	  is	  no	  kind	  of	  freedom	  outside	  of	  that	  secured	  by	  self-­‐ownership	  that	  we	  can	  assess	  and	  Cohen	  and	  Nozick	  appear	  to	  be	  operating	  under	  different	  senses	  of	  autonomy.	  	  This	  is	  Brenkert’s	  response	  to	  Cohen’s	  argument	  (Brenkert,	  42).	  This	  objection	  doesn’t	  hold	  water	  given	  a	  eudaimonistic	  framework	  supporting	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Absent	  the	  belief	  that	  libertarian	  rights	  are	  put	  in	  place	  in	  order	  for	  a	  person	  to	  have	  control	  over	  her	  life,	  those	  rights	  will	  sometimes	  merely	  protect	  formal	  side-­‐constraints	  around	  people	  who	  lack	  any	  real	  sense	  of	  control.	  	  But	  as	  his	  justification	  of	  side-­‐constraints	  shows,	  Nozick	  clearly	  wants	  something	  more	  than	  formal	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  –	  he	  wants	  to	  protect	  a	  substantive	  kind	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  that	  gives	  us	  the	  ability	  to	  effectively	  control	  our	  lives	  and	  develop	  our	  talents.	  	  If	  Nozick	  is	  not	  claiming	  that	  libertarian	  rights	  are	  meant	  to	  ensure	  the	  success	  of	  one’s	  life-­‐shaping	  capacity	  and	  control	  over	  one’s	  life,	  what	  those	  rights	  protect	  is	  sometimes	  empty	  and	  merely	  legal.	  	  	  Will	  Kymlicka	  thinks	  the	  term	  “self-­‐determination”	  better	  captures	  the	  substantive	  level	  of	  control	  libertarian	  constraints	  are	  meant	  to	  protect.	  	  Whereas	  self-­‐ownership	  can	  sometimes	  be	  used	  to	  describe	  the	  purely	  legal	  rights	  a	  person	  has,	  self-­‐determination	  involves	  the	  freedom	  to	  act	  on	  our	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  and	  exercise	  a	  more	  substantive	  kind	  of	  control	  over	  our	  lives	  (Kymlicka,	  “Property	  Rights	  and	  the	  Self-­‐Ownership	  Argument,”	  305).	  	  This	  substantive	  level	  of	  control	  correlates	  to	  Cohen’s	  conception	  of	  autonomy	  as	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices.	  	  A	  person	  has	  self-­‐determination	  if	  she	  can	  shape	  her	  life	  according	  to	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  she	  has	  sufficient	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  resources	  available	  to	  her	  to	  do	  so.	  	  Furthermore,	  since	  self-­‐determination	  operates	  on	  an	  understanding	  of	  autonomy	  as	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices,	  it	  requires	  more	  than	  the	  negative	  freedom	  that	  formal	  self-­‐ownership	  provides	  since	  many	  people	  possess	  purely	  formal	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  without	  having	  the	  further	  ability	  to	  act	  on	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.	  	  Respecting	  self-­‐determination	  is	  therefore	  necessary	  for	  treating	  people	  as	  distinct	  individuals	  each	  with	  their	  own	  life	  to	  lead.	  We	  need	  to	  address	  just	  what	  conditions	  self-­‐determination	  places	  on	  genuine	  freedom.	  	  However,	  it’s	  not	  necessary	  to	  place	  any	  positive	  conditions	  on	  freedom	  at	  all	  –	  as	  Kymlicka	  does	  –	  to	  support	  Kymlicka’s	  intuition	  that	  non-­‐interference	  fails	  to	  protect	  freedom	  of	  a	  meaningful	  sort.	  	  Philip	  Pettit	  argues	  that	  there	  is	  an	  intermediate	  space	  for	  freedom	  that	  shows	  that	  non-­‐interference	  is	  too	  thin	  to	  capture	  meaningful	  of	  freedom.	  Pettit	  argues	  that	  Berlin’s	  negative-­‐positive	  distinction	  leaves	  a	  conceptual	  space	  open	  for	  a	  third	  kind	  of	  freedom:	  freedom	  as	  non-­domination.	  	  Negative	  freedom	  involves	  the	  absence	  of	  interference	  in	  one’s	  choices;	  positive	  freedom,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  requires	  that	  an	  agent	  be	  able	  to	  exercise	  “self-­‐mastery”	  over	  herself	  (Pettit,	  Republicanism,	  18).	  	  Mastery	  and	  interference,	  Pettit	  says,	  “do	  not	  amount	  to	  the	  same	  thing”	  (21).	  	  Therefore,	  there	  is	  a	  third	  possible	  way	  to	  conceive	  of	  freedom:	  not	  just	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  interference	  but	  as	  an	  absence	  of	  mastery	  by	  others.	  	  This	  freedom	  as	  non-­‐domination,	  Pettit	  says,	  is	  the	  republican	  notion	  of	  liberty.	  	  It	  is	  negative	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  stresses	  an	  absence,	  but	  positive	  to	  the	  extent	  that	  it	  stresses	  mastery	  instead	  of	  interference	  (22).	  	  Someone	  enjoys	  non-­‐domination	  “when	  they	  live	  among	  others	  and	  when	  no	  other…	  has	  the	  capacity	  to	  interfere	  on	  an	  arbitrary	  basis	  in	  their	  choices”	  (Pettit,	  67).	  	  The	  capacity	  to	  be	  arbitrarily	  dominated	  defines	  domination.	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  interference.	  	  This	  means	  that	  slavery	  and	  unfreedom	  is	  consistent	  with	  non-­‐interference.	  	  Non-­‐interference	  can	  be	  realized,	  Pettit	  says,	  “in	  the	  presence	  of	  a	  master	  or	  authority	  who	  is	  beneficent,	  and	  even	  benevolent”	  (64).	  	  For	  example,	  a	  slave	  is	  not	  free	  to	  do	  as	  he	  pleases	  although	  his	  master	  is	  lenient	  and	  the	  slave	  is	  adept	  at	  avoiding	  interference	  in	  his	  plans.	  	  	  The	  possibility	  of	  domination	  without	  interference	  supports	  Kymlicka’s	  and	  Cohen’s	  intuition	  that	  worker	  Z	  is	  unfree.	  	  Although	  there	  is	  no	  direct	  interference	  preventing	  Z	  from	  pursuing	  his	  own	  ends,	  his	  situation	  is	  unfree	  because	  the	  capitalist	  appropriators	  effectively	  constitute	  dominating	  masters	  over	  his	  range	  of	  employment	  choices.	  	  Whether	  or	  not	  we	  ascribe	  to	  Pettit’s	  view	  of	  republican	  freedom	  as	  a	  political	  ideal,	  I	  think	  his	  argument	  at	  least	  demonstrates	  that	  non-­‐interference	  –	  the	  hallmark	  of	  negative	  freedom	  –	  is	  insufficient	  to	  guarantee	  that	  in	  all	  cases	  a	  person	  will	  enjoy	  freedom	  of	  a	  meaningful	  sort.	  	  Worker	  Z’s	  situation	  is	  one	  such	  case.	  Moreover,	  Pettit’s	  view	  demonstrates	  that	  freedom	  as	  non-­‐domination	  does	  better	  than	  mere	  non-­‐interference	  at	  granting	  an	  individual	  the	  sort	  of	  control	  over	  her	  life	  that	  Nozick	  wants	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  principle	  to	  secure.	  	  As	  Pettit	  puts	  it,	  “non-­‐domination	  involves	  a	  sort	  of	  immunity	  or	  security	  against	  interference	  on	  an	  arbitrary	  basis,	  not	  the	  mere	  absence	  of	  such	  interference”	  (69).	  	  For	  a	  person	  may	  enjoy	  non-­‐interference	  from	  arbitrary	  forces,	  but	  the	  non-­‐interference	  she	  enjoys	  may	  be	  insecure	  and	  she	  may	  remain	  powerless	  over	  the	  course	  of	  her	  life.	  	  It	  is	  possible,	  Pettit	  says,	  that	  there	  are	  dominating	  agents	  over	  this	  person,	  but	  they	  happen	  to	  like	  her,	  or	  she	  happens	  to	  be	  cunning	  at	  avoiding	  their	  control,	  or	  they	  simply	  leave	  her	  alone,	  etc.	  (69).	  	  The	  control	  this	  person	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  contingent	  upon	  external	  forces.	  	  Non-­‐domination,	  on	  the	  other	  hand,	  grants	  a	  person	  the	  control	  and	  power	  over	  her	  life	  such	  that	  she	  not	  only	  avoids	  interference	  from	  others	  in	  the	  actual	  world,	  but	  she	  has	  the	  power	  to	  prevent	  interference	  given	  a	  possible	  world	  where	  she	  isn’t	  ingratiating	  enough,	  cunning	  enough	  or	  whatever	  enough	  to	  avoid	  interference.	  Again,	  we	  need	  not	  necessarily	  agree	  with	  Pettit	  that	  the	  kind	  of	  freedom	  that	  matters	  ought	  to	  be	  understood	  as	  non-­‐domination.	  	  But	  his	  arguments	  do	  provide	  further	  support	  for	  rejecting	  the	  negative	  freedom	  as	  non-­‐interference	  that	  Nozick’s	  full	  self-­‐ownership	  secures.	  Still,	  it	  seems	  to	  me	  that	  the	  features	  Cohen	  includes	  in	  genuine	  freedom	  point	  to	  a	  positive	  conception.	  	  To	  be	  free,	  according	  to	  Cohen,	  is	  to	  be	  autonomous	  such	  that	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  options	  exists	  to	  choose	  between.	  	  He	  places	  the	  “acceptable	  range”	  condition	  on	  autonomy	  based	  on	  an	  argument	  much	  like	  the	  following.	  	  Raz	  notes	  that	  one	  can	  either	  think	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  kind	  of	  achievement,	  as	  Cohen	  does,	  or	  as	  a	  capacity,	  as	  Nozick	  does.	  	  In	  the	  first	  sense,	  one	  is	  autonomous	  if	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  autonomous	  life	  obtain;	  in	  the	  second	  sense,	  one	  is	  autonomous	  if	  he	  can	  become	  the	  author	  of	  his	  life	  (Raz,	  
The	  Morality	  of	  Freedom,	  204).	  	  One	  who	  supports	  a	  rights	  view	  of	  autonomy	  only	  thinks	  of	  autonomy	  as	  a	  capacity,	  since	  “he	  has	  to	  maintain	  that	  autonomy	  is	  constituted	  by	  rights	  and	  nothing	  else”	  (204).	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  rights	  constitute	  the	  moral	  space	  for	  a	  person	  to	  autonomously	  lead	  his	  own	  life	  in	  Nozick’s	  system.	  	  To	  lead	  an	  autonomous	  life	  is	  to	  lead	  a	  life	  where	  your	  rights	  have	  not	  been	  violated.	  	  This	  is	  because	  our	  rights	  protect	  our	  
opportunities.	  	  Truly	  being	  autonomous	  and	  free	  requires	  the	  means	  available	  such	  that	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices	  exists.	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  under	  the	  rights	  view	  of	  autonomy,	  if	  leading	  an	  autonomous	  life	  is	  an	  ultimate	  value,	  “then	  having	  a	  sufficient	  range	  of	  acceptable	  options	  is	  of	  intrinsic	  value,	  for	  it	  is	  constitutive	  of	  an	  autonomous	  life	  that	  it	  is	  lived	  in	  circumstances	  where	  acceptable	  alternatives	  are	  present”	  (205).	  	  A	  person	  who	  spends	  his	  life	  fighting	  starvation	  and	  disease	  cannot	  be	  said	  to	  be	  autonomous	  because	  he	  lacks	  the	  opportunity	  to	  accomplish	  anything	  besides	  staying	  alive.	  	  Thus	  the	  ideal	  of	  personal	  autonomy,	  according	  to	  Raz,	  requires	  acceptable	  options	  to	  choose	  from.	  If	  a	  eudaimonistic	  framework	  does	  in	  fact	  undergird	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis,	  it	  does	  not	  show	  that	  Nozick	  endorses	  a	  positive	  account	  of	  freedom.	  	  Nozick	  thinks	  of	  freedom	  as	  non-­‐interference.	  	  But	  if	  a	  eudaimonistic	  framework	  supports	  self-­‐ownership	  then	  two	  things	  must	  be	  true.	  	  First,	  freedom	  cannot	  just	  be	  derivative	  of	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Second,	  the	  autonomy	  and	  freedom	  self-­‐ownership	  protects	  ought	  to	  be	  meaningful	  so	  that	  a	  person	  has	  the	  control	  to	  pursue	  his	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good.	  	  According	  to	  Raz,	  this	  involves	  the	  ability	  to	  choose	  from	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices.	  	  If	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  valuable	  because	  it	  secures	  autonomy	  for	  a	  person,	  this	  must	  further	  entail	  that	  acceptable	  options	  are	  available	  so	  that	  the	  autonomy	  self-­‐ownership	  secures	  is	  the	  sort	  required	  for	  flourishing.	  Therefore,	  given	  a	  eudaimonistic	  foundation	  for	  self-­‐ownership,	  something	  like	  self-­‐determination	  describes	  the	  kind	  of	  freedom	  Nozick	  intends	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  secure	  for	  each	  person.	  	  Self-­‐determination	  also	  seems	  to	  capture	  the	  genuine	  autonomy	  Cohen	  uses	  to	  appraise	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  We	  are	  now	  in	  a	  position	  to	  answer	  Brenkert’s	  objection.	  Cohen	  makes	  an	  argument	  that	  should	  appeal	  to	  libertarians	  on	  their	  own	  terms	  because	  Nozick	  ought	  to	  conceive	  of	  freedom	  in	  Cohen’s	  sense,	  where	  autonomy	  is	  ethically	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  to	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Nozick’s	  normative	  structure	  puts	  autonomy	  first	  and	  side-­‐constraints	  second	  just	  because	  it	  upholds	  self-­‐determination.	  	  If	  self-­‐determination	  matters,	  the	  rights	  protecting	  it	  matter	  because	  they	  ensure	  the	  exercise	  of	  certain	  abilities	  –	  my	  capacity	  for	  self-­‐governance	  is	  crucial	  to	  my	  freedom.	  	  If	  we	  don’t	  care	  about	  the	  exercise	  of	  our	  life-­‐shaping	  abilities,	  then	  the	  propertyless	  proletarian	  isn’t	  harmed.	  	  Yet	  self-­‐determination	  is	  justified	  by	  eudaimonistic	  considerations:	  Nozick	  believes	  that	  libertarian	  rights	  give	  the	  propertyless	  proletarian	  space	  enough	  to	  shape	  his	  life	  according	  to	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  and	  flourish,	  which	  demonstrates	  a	  belief	  that	  libertarian	  rights	  serve	  to	  protect	  self-­‐determination.	  	  It	  follows	  that	  freedom	  and	  human	  autonomy	  are	  ethically	  prior	  to	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  and	  Nozick	  and	  Cohen	  both	  see	  the	  relationship	  between	  autonomy	  and	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  in	  the	  same	  light.	  	  Self-­‐ownership	  cannot	  be	  basic	  if	  self-­‐determination	  matters.	  If	  I	  am	  correct	  and	  eudaimonistic	  moral	  beliefs	  ought	  to	  undergird	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis,	  self-­‐ownership	  can	  be	  assessed	  in	  light	  of	  whether	  it	  actually	  promotes	  human	  flourishing	  in	  the	  relevant	  ways.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  at	  the	  core	  of	  Nozick’s	  normative	  structure	  behind	  self-­‐ownership	  is	  the	  belief	  that	  people	  ought	  to	  be	  free	  to	  act	  on	  their	  own	  conceptions	  of	  the	  good	  and	  to	  strive	  for	  meaning	  in	  their	  lives.	  To	  the	  extent	  that	  Cohen’s	  propertyless	  proletarian	  lacks	  an	  acceptable	  range	  of	  choices	  to	  choose	  from,	  self-­‐ownership	  clearly	  undercuts	  his	  freedom.	  	  The	  self-­‐determination	  Nozick	  defends	  commits	  him	  to	  a	  conception	  of	  autonomy	  much	  like	  Cohen’s	  “range	  of	  acceptable	  choices.”	  	  Nozick	  intends	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  secure	  a	  substantive	  kind	  of	  freedom	  –	  self-­‐determination	  –	  where	  a	  person	  has	  autonomous	  control	  over	  the	  course	  of	  his	  life.	  	  As	  we	  have	  seen,	  however,	  he	  also	  believes	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  licenses	  the	  appropriation	  and	  use	  of	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  external	  resources	  such	  that	  some	  people	  will	  become	  propertyless	  proletarians	  who	  must	  choose	  between	  selling	  their	  labor	  power	  or	  dying.	  	  Since	  this	  situation	  doesn’t	  allow	  the	  propertyless	  proletarian	  to	  meaningfully	  develop	  and	  act	  on	  his	  own	  conception	  of	  the	  good	  in	  order	  to	  pursue	  meaning	  in	  his	  life,	  we	  can	  say	  that	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  is	  in	  fact	  hostile	  to	  his	  autonomy.	  	  
Conclusion	  	  I	  haven’t	  considered	  what	  the	  conditions	  for	  positive	  freedom	  are	  beyond	  autonomy	  of	  a	  certain	  sort,	  and	  how	  they	  ought	  to	  be	  incorporated	  into	  a	  political	  system	  in	  order	  for	  Nozickian	  self-­‐ownership	  to	  accommodate	  them.	  	  My	  sole	  concern	  in	  this	  thesis	  has	  been	  to	  explore	  the	  relationship	  between	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  and	  freedom,	  and	  to	  assess	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  the	  former	  restricts	  the	  latter.	  	  I	  think	  the	  case	  is	  clear	  that	  Nozick’s	  self-­‐ownership	  does	  little	  to	  protect	  a	  meaningful	  sort	  of	  freedom;	  despite	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  meaningful	  sort	  of	  freedom	  is	  exactly	  what	  Nozick	  ought	  to	  protect.	  	  This	  is	  the	  central	  premise	  in	  my	  argument,	  and	  the	  premise	  I	  found	  unsupported	  in	  Cohen’s	  original	  argument.	  	  I	  believe	  I	  have	  buttressed	  it	  by	  suggesting	  that	  Nozick	  can	  employ	  eudaimonistic	  normative	  beliefs	  to	  justify	  self-­‐ownership.	  	  Doing	  so	  explains	  the	  value	  of	  autonomy.	  	  However,	  it	  also	  cedes	  ground	  to	  critics	  of	  negative	  liberty	  by	  undermining	  the	  belief	  that	  self-­‐ownership	  rights	  are	  basic	  in	  ways	  that	  autonomy	  is	  not.	  	  Like	  Cohen,	  I	  find	  the	  concept	  of	  self-­‐ownership	  intuitively	  attractive	  because	  it	  seems	  to	  express	  a	  basic	  point	  about	  my	  freedom	  and	  right	  to	  flourish.	  	  However,	  for	  those	  same	  reasons	  I	  find	  the	  self-­‐ownership	  thesis	  troubling.	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